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LEARNING FROM LIBERAL THEORY: 
PROCESS, PROCEDURE, AND THE 
COMMON GOOD 
STEPHEN C. ROWNfREE, S.1.* 
A precept of Catholic social theology is that public policy must be 
designed to protect and promote the common good.1The common good in-
cludes everyone's good, and therefore it shares with liberal political theory 
a commitment to equality? However, Catholic social theology's under-
standing of the common good sharply differs from liberal theory's neutral-
ity about the substance of the human good. Because of conflicts about full 
notions of the human good, liberal theory focuses on procedural justice to 
find fundamental norms for social cooperation.3 
Whether liberal theory can adequately define basic principles and 
structures without a substantive view of the human good remains contro-
verted. Questions in bioethics, especially, seem to require a substantive 
view about what makes for a long and healthy life. For example, Daniel 
Callahan argues that we will never begin to have a reasonable allocation of 
medical resources without such a notion.4 He judges that lacking a shared 
view of what constitutes a long and healthy life makes it impossible for us 
to know when death should be expected and accepted.5 The result is ever-
increasing (but increasingly useless) medical interventions in the last 
months of life.6 
I propose, however, to develop a different point, namely that Catholic 
social teaching and the Catholic Church need to learn from liberal theory's 
insights about procedural justice's contribution to defining the common 
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, Loyola University, New Orleans. 
I. Catechism of the Catholic Church: Modificationsfrom the Edifio T.vpica No. 1910 (avail-
able at http://www.vatican.valarchiveIENGOOI51_P6K.HTM). 
2. ld. at No. 1906. 
3. I have in mind John Rawls's work. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed., 
Harvard U. Press 1999). 
4. Daniel Callahan, False Hopes: Why America' s Quest for Perfect Health is a Recipe for 
Failure 267 (Simon & Schuster 1998). 
5. ld. at 130-31. 
6. ld. at 142-44. 
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good.7 This article will first define procedural justice as it is understood in 
liberal theory. Secondly, it will argue that Catholic politicians' votes on 
abortion often reflect fidelity to procedural justice, rather than disregard for 
human life. Because procedural justice is essential in a democratic society 
that upholds human dignity, the Church should support politicians who 
work for changes that respect constitutional checks and balances. Finally, 
this article will use the post-Vatican II inquiry into the Church's policy on 
contraception for married couples as a case study in missed opportunities. 
The Church, in disregarding the outcome that emerged from an authenti-
cally inclusive process, undermined its own authority with Catholic married 
couples and thereby hurt the Church's common good. 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN LIBERAL THEORY 
Procedural justice refers to processes (e.g., selection by lot, decision 
by majority rule, first-come first-serve, presidential nomination plus Senate 
advice and consent) for achieving a fair or just result. John Rawls's discus-
sion of procedural justice seems to me a helpful starting point. He presents 
the distributive justice problem of a parent, one last piece of chocolate cake, 
and two young chocolate cake lovers. Is there a procedure the parent can 
require the children to use that will insure each child gets a fair share, in 
this case an equal share? The procedure that seems to insure this outcome 
gives one child the knife to cut the cake, but the other child the first choice 
of piece of cake. Rawls suggests this is an example of "perfect procedural 
justice": we know an equal division is a substantively just division, and we 
have a procedure for obtaining it. 8 
Two familiar examples of procedural justice are the adversary system 
of criminal justice, and constitutional democracy in which a written consti-
tution spells out a division of roles, responsibilities, powers, reserved rights, 
and so forth. 
Concerning the adversary system of criminal justice, we know what 
justice requires: that the guilty are convicted and the innocent go free, but 
we don't have procedures absolutely guaranteed to accomplish this end.9 
7. Pope John XXIII's 1963 encyclical Pacem in Terris and the Second Vatican Council's 
Declaration on Religious Liberty (1965) reflect a new appreciation of process and procedure in 
the form of constitutional democracy, which protects rights by granting them constitutional pro-
tection. Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris (Apr. 11, 1963) (available at http://www.vatican.val 
holy _father/john_xxiiiJencyclicals/documents/hfj-xxiii3nc_ll 041963 _pacem_ en.html); Second 
Vatican Council, Dignitatis Humanae [Declaration on Religious Freedom] (Dec. 7, 1965) (availa-
ble at http://www.vatican.valarchi ve/hisccouncils/iL vatican_councilldocuments/vat -ii_decCl965 
1207 _dignitatis-humanae_en.html). 
8. Rawls, supra n. 3, at 74. 
9. I cite the adversary system only by way of example. Cogent criticisms of the shortcom-
ings of our current criminal justice system have been made by many, including the U.S. Catholic 
bishops. See e.g. U.S. Conf. Catholic Bishops. Responsibility, Rehabilitation, and Restoration: A 
Catholic Perspective on Crime and Criminal Justice (Nov. 15, 2000) (available at http:// 
www.usccb.org/sdwp/criminal.htm). 
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Rather than insisting that each of the different actors (accused, prosecutor, 
defense attorney, and judge) directly seek this just outcome, roles and re-
sponsibilities are divided, with the hope that justice will more likely be 
done by the overall process. 
The accused is presumed innocent and hires a lawyer, or, if unable to 
afford a lawyer, is provided one. The defense attorney's role and responsi-
bility is to orchestrate a defense to the charges, one that shows that the 
defendant did not commit the crime or that there is not evidence "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that he or she did. The prosecuting attorney's role is to 
marshal the evidence and make the case for the defendant's conviction. 
Prosecutors and police must disclose to the defense attorney evidence they 
have uncovered that tends to show the defendant is innocent. A judge refer-
ees and makes sure that both attorneys follow procedure and rules (of evi-
dence, for example). After the judge instructs the jury on matters of law, the 
jury decides guilt or innocence based on their assessments of the facts and 
the law as argued by the two attorneys. Even though a defense attorney may 
know or believe her client guilty, her assigned role is to organize a defense 
to the charges. Besides the processes of the actual trial, appeals to higher 
courts are also provided for. Attorneys for someone convicted in the trial 
court can make a case that errors of law were made in the course of the trial 
that justify either a retrial or a reversal of the original conviction and freeing 
of the defendant. Several levels of appeals courts, ending with a supreme or 
highest court, exist, and when relief is refused at a lower level, a higher-
level court can be appealed to. Achieving justice through the division of 
roles and responsibilities requires an independent judiciary ruling according 
to law (and not according to the whims of the ruling power). 
In the year 2000, I happened to be teaching in Zimbabwe when a fu11-
scale attack on the judiciary's independence was launched. It quickly be-
came clear that an independent judiciary was a most fragile flower when 
confronted by a government that was determined to accomplish its aims and 
to establish a monopoly on power. This attack and the subsequent manipu-
lation of court cases by government-appointed party loyalists play-acting as 
independent arbiters reflected the government's utter disdain for any good 
other than preserving its monopoly of power.lO 
The distribution of roles and responsibilities in a just, adversarial sys-
tem calls to mind the larger framework of a government composed of dif-
ferent organs with limited but interlinked powers, set down in a 
constitution. The aspect of the common good achievable by such a frame of 
government is the limitation and restriction on coercive power within defi-
nite boundaries. This leaves open space for other associations including 
churches, families, and voluntary organizations of all kinds to function. 
10. See Richard Brown, Zimbabwe: Recent History, in Africa South of the Sahara 2005, at 
1254, 1258 (lain Frame & Katharine Murison eds., 34th ed., Europa Publieations 2004). 
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A somewhat more particularized process or procedure that such a lim-
ited government uses to promote the common good is giving constitutional 
protection to certain rights integral to this good. For example, the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to free 
exercise of religion, free speech, free press, and free association. Because 
the Constitution guarantees several rights, these rights can come into con-
flict; for example, the right of the press to report on crimes often conflicts 
with the right of an accused to a fair trial. 
In a mature constitutional system such as the United States', the pre-
cise boundaries of the conflicting constitutional rights are constantly being 
redrawn as courts resolve conflicts that arise. Conflicts between aspects of 
the common good are authoritatively resolved, though obviously never to 
everyone's satisfaction. The people always have recourse to the process of 
amending the Constitution should they judge the courts to have fatally mis-
interpreted constitutional rights. This process is an arduous one, as the Con-
stitution is not easily amended. This article makes further reference to 
amending the Constitution below in discussing the procedural aspects of the 
abortion controversy. 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS 
Pope John XXIII's 1963 encyclical Pacem in Terris expresses what 
seems to me a new appreciation and endorsement of a constitutional divi-
sion of powers as essential means to promote the common good. II This 
encyclical repeats Mater et Magistra's definition of the common good as 
"all those social conditions which favor the full development of human per-
sonality."12 But Pope John goes on to observe that the common good can be 
translated into protection and promotions of human rights (and concomitant 
duties): "It is generally accepted today that the common good is best safe-
guarded when personal rights and duties are guaranteed."13 
Pope John then points out the link between guaranteeing rights and 
limiting government powers with a written constitution. His reasoning be-
gins by reiterating the traditional teaching that authority comes from God 
and is given to the people. But in a major change from Francisco Suarez's14 
view that the people could not exercise this power but only hand it over to 
rulers, Pope John, in Pacem in Terris paragraph 52, proclaims that the peo-
ple can exercise their God-given authority by choosing their rulers and es-
11. Pope John XXIII. supra n. 7, at Nos. 75-77. 
12. [d. at No. 58 (quoting Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, No. 65 (May 15, 1961)). 
13. ld. at No. 60. 
14. The Renaissance Jesuit theologian and philosopher (1548-1617) who, in his De Defensio 
Fidei, criticized the absolutist claims of James I of England. New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia. 
Francisco Suarez. http://www.newadvent.org/cathenl14319a.htm (last updated Oct. 6,2005). 
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tablishing a form of government. 15 And the essential act for determining 
who rules under what form of government, as we have come to recognize, 
is to design a framework of government that sets out a division of powers, 
grants specific powers to different officeholders and organs, and employs 
mechanisms that integrate the functioning of these officers and organs. 16 
Pope John XXIII concludes that this teaching is consistent with de-
mocracy, specifically, "any genuinely democratic form of government."!7 I 
read paragraph 52 to endorse not just any kind of democracy, but a "consti-
tutional democracy," where powers are limited and minority rights are pro-
tected against overbearing majorities. 
In paragraph 69 of Pacem in Terris, I infer an appreciation that courts 
insulated from the popular will are essential to protecting minority rights. 
Paragraph 69 contains an endorsement of the impartial administration of 
justice, and especially of judges who are independent and honest: "[S]o too 
in the courts: justice must be administered impartially, and judges must be 
wholly incorrupt and uninfluenced by the solicitations of interested 
parties." 18 
The Second Vatican Council's Dignitatis Humanae (Declaration on 
Religious Freedom) makes explicit the link between the right to freedom 
from government coercion in matters of religious belief and practice and its 
guarantee in a written constitution. 19 The decree, in paragraph 15, makes a 
de facto link between freedom of religion as "a civil right in most constitu-
tions" and constitutional protection as the precise way this right is assured: 
"[I]t is necessary that religious freedom be everywhere provided with an 
effective constitutional guarantee .... "20 This decree recognizes in its very 
first article that the ordinary means to make effective important individual 
and group freedoms is through setting limits to the legitimate powers of 
government in a constitution. 
The appreciation of constitutional democracy that emerges in Pope 
John XXIII's Pacem in Terris and in the documents of the Second Vatican 
Council comes, I suggest, from a reading of historical experience, espe-
cially the historical experience of Europe and America (North and South) 
15. See Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: The Age of Refor-
mation vol. 2, 183 (Cambridge U. Press 1978); Pope John XXIII, supra n. 7. at No. 52. 
16. "The fact that authority comes from God does not mean that men have no power to 
choose those who are to rule the State, or to decide upon the type of government they want, and 
detennine the procedure and limitations of rulers in the exercise of their authority." [d. 
17. ld. 
18. ld. at No. 69; see also id. at No. 70 (,There can be no doubt that a State juridical system 
which conforms to the principles of justice and rightness, and corresponds to the degree of civic 
maturity evinced by the State in question, is highly conducive to the attainment of the common 
good."). 
19. Second Vatican Council, supra n. 7, at No. 15. 
20. ld..; compare with id. at No.2 ("This right of the human person to religious freedom is to 
be recognized in the constitutional law whereby society is governed and thus it is to become a 
civil right."). 
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from the First World War and the post-World War II reconstruction of Eu-
rope and Japan. By the 1960s it was evident that constitutional democracy 
was the most stable and effective form of government, and was best able to 
protect human rights and the common good?l 
Successful establishment and preservation of constitutional democra-
cies testified to a certain corning of age of the citizens of these democracies. 
They were no longer like children needing to be led, but could, in a broad 
sense, rule themselves. The processes and procedures for such self-rule 
were spelled out in written constitutions that divided and limited govern-
ment powers in ways that allowed both for broad freedoms and for the 
effective exercise of necessary government functions. The growing sense of 
the dignity of human beings that led the Second Vatican Council to ac-
knowledge their religious freedom in Dignitatis Humanae likewise influ-
enced the Church's endorsement of constitutional democracy. 
That the dignity of humans justifies constitutional democracy is among 
the positive reasons for endorsing this form of government. The Church has 
corne to recognize this. I don't find, however, a comparable appreciation of 
the evils that constitutional democracy seeks to address. Principal among 
these is the tendency of sinful human beings to abuse power, sometimes for 
personal gain, and sometimes just for the perverse pleasure of dominating 
others. The tendency to abuse power constitutes one reason to limit and 
divide government powers. If the powers and offices are properly divided 
and linked, ambitious officeholders will serve to check and balance each 
other.22 My African students, too many of whom had witnessed at first-
hand the absence of constitutional checks and balances on powerful leaders, 
found Lord Acton's oft-quoted saying, "[P]ower corrupts and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely,,,23 to be spot on. 
The divided-powers form of government, with a strong president, has 
disadvantages, especially when the citizenry is sharply divided into differ-
ent ethnic or religious groups. The common good of unity amidst severe 
and long-standing divisions perhaps requires a rather different frame of 
government, one in which the different groups are assured a share in power. 
A large literature on constitutional design addressing such questions devel-
oped in the twentieth century. Rather than the U.S. model, the Westminster 
model-in which a majority of the parliament is required to rule -makes 
for coalition building, which encourages policies acceptable to the conflict-
ing groups.24 
21. [d. at !"o. 15. 
22. The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison). 
23. Llr. from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), in Essays on Freedom 
and Power 335 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed .• Peter Smith 1972). 
24. I have in mind the work of political scientist Arend Lijphart. See Arend Lijphart, Democ-
racy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (Yale U. Press 1977) and later works. 
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A severe defect of parliamentary systems with a written constitution 
subject to amendment by a two-thirds parliamentary majority is the relative 
ease with which a government with such a large majority can change the 
constitution. Such constitutional instability has characterized far too many 
African countries. One such example I am familiar with comes from 
Zambia. Kenneth Kaunda, the country's founding father ruled from 1964 
until 1991.25 The voters were so disgusted by the government's economic 
mismanagement and arbitrary rule that it was thrown out of office en masse 
and replaced by a party that pledged to amend the constitution to allow for 
the president to serve only two consecutive terms in office.26 MMD (Move-
ment for Multiparty Democracy), the party led by longtime trades union 
leader Frederick Chiluba, used its over two-thirds majority to do just that.27 
However, as his second term was coming to an end, Chiluba launched a 
very serious move to amend the constitution so he could continue in of-
fice?S Fortunately, civic, business, and church groups were able to unite in 
a coalition that turned back this attempt. 29 
CATHOLIC POLITICIANS AND ABORTION 
As we have seen, the United States is a constitutional democracy. The 
Constitution spells out a variety of elected and appointed offices with par-
ticular responsibilities. The offices are so structured that they check and 
balance each other. Those elected or appointed to particular offices must 
fulfill the responsibilities of their offices. 
Attending to the constitutional division of powers provides a neglected 
perspective on questions of Catholic politicians who support abortion, a 
controverted issue in the last presidential election. It seems to me that bish-
ops who held that Catholic officials who supported abortion were so un-
faithful to the Church's teaching that they should not receive communion 
were blind to questions of role, responsibility, and procedure. 
Bishop Raymond Burke, then bishop of La Crosse, Wisconsin (now 
archbishop of St. Louis), decreed in November 2003 that "Catholic legisla-
tors, who are members of the faithful of the Diocese of La Crosse and who 
continue to support procured abortion or euthanasia may not present them-
selves to receive Holy Communion."30 Bishop Burke explained that his de-
cree followed private consultations and letters that had failed to persuade 
the legislators in question to alter their views on abortion. The most promi-
25. Gregory Mthembu-Salter, Zambia: Recent History, in Africa South of the Sahara 2005, 
supra n. 10, at 1226-27. 
26. Jd. at 1227. 
27. !d. 
28. Jd. at 1230. 
29. Jd. at 1230-31. 
30. Raymond Burke, Notification (Nov. 23, 2003) (available at http://www.ewtn,comJIibrary/ 
bishopslburkenot.htm). 
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nent of the three legislators sanctioned was David Obey, representative 
from Wisconsin. Representative Obey gave an extended account of his 
views in "My Conscience, My Vote."3l 
Taking account of a Catholic legislator's role and responsibilities al-
lows for an interpretation of votes supporting abortion rights that does not 
immediately impute moral approval of abortion. If the legislator is a mem-
ber of the lower house of Congress (the House of Representatives), as was 
Rep. Obey, or the lower house of a state legislature, her role is precisely to 
represent her constituents' views.32 I would venture to say that such a repre-
sentative is duty bound by reason of her elected office to represent faith-
fully the interests (and strong preferences) of her constituents. This does not 
mean that a representative may not for compelling moral reasons vote 
against her constituents' wishes. But such a vote will be rare as a matter of 
right and of fact: rare as a matter of right because a representative's duty is 
to represent constituent interests; rare as a matter of fact because a represen-
tative unresponsive to constituents' interests will be voted out of office. 
When Father Robert Drinan represented a district whose voters were 
strongly against the Vietnam War and strongly in favor of aid to Israel, he 
rightly and vigorously represented both views?3 His New England Jesuit 
brothers, who had had many years of experience in the Middle East work-
ing with Arabs, objected to those who so one-sidedly, in their opinion, sup-
ported IsraeP4 According to my logic, Father Drinan did precisely what he 
was elected to do. However, I thought at the time and still do, that such 
partisan advocacy of one side of a complex issue is inconsistent with the 
priestly office, which requires priests to offer moral advice on complex is-
sues from above the fray. Father Drinan's religious superiors asked him to 
withdraw from electoral politics as a U.S. representative and he left Con-
31. David R. Obey, My Conscience, My Vote, 191:4 America 8 (Aug. 16,2004). The Oct. 18 
issue contained several letters replying to the initial article. Dennis O'Brien et a!., Letters, 191: 11 
America 27, 28-29 (Oct. 18, 2004). 
32. I don't mean to imply that this was Representative Obey's own defense of his votes on 
abortion. His actual voting record shows him to be a most conscientious and principled legislator. 
He notes in his America apologia that he has voted "well over 60 times for limitations of one kind 
or another on a woman's right to choose abOrtion." Obey, supra n. 31, at 9. 
33. For Drinan's support of Israel, see 121 Congo Rec. Hl4137 (daily ed. May 13,1975) (co-
signer of resolution urging new jet fighters, "electronic counter measures, and other sophisticated 
weapons necessary to insure the continued viability ofIsrael"), 121 Congo Rec. H23l92 (daily ed. 
July 16, 1975) (objecting to sales of missiles to Jordan), and 121 Congo Rec. S27406 (Sept. 3, 
1975) (speech objecting to efforts to expel Israel from the United Nations). 
34. The SJNews of September 1971 contains an open letter signed by "[s]eventy New En-
gland Jesuits with Middle East experience," protesting a Jan. II, 1970, speech by Fr. Charles 
Casassa, SJ, Chancellor of Loyola University, Los Angeles, about his recent visit to Israel. The 
introduction to the letter observes, "Fr. Casassa spoke in glowing terms of what he saw and heard 
in Israel. The speech betrayed a pathetic ignorance of the Arab-Israeli conflict and an uncritical 
acceptance of Israeli propaganda." Mission to Islam, I SJNews (mthly. newsltr. of the New Eng. 
province) 12 (Sept. 1971). 
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gress in 1980.35 Once we attend to a representative's role in our constitu-
tional system and its division of powers and responsibilities, we should 
hesitate to conclude on the basis of a vote on abortion (perhaps even for 
federal or state funding for them) that the legislator is either for or against 
abortions, which indeed unjustly and inhumanely kill innocent human 
beings.36 
Traditional Catholic moral theology makes careful distinctions with re-
gard to "cooperation" in evil. 37 The question of whether Catholics can vote 
for a so-called "pro-choice" candidate is clarified by recalling the distinc-
tion between "formal" and "material" cooperation.38 Voting for a candidate 
precisely because he was in favor of abortion was judged to be "formal" 
cooperation and as such wrong. But voting for a pro-choice candidate for 
other reasons was judged to be remote "material" cooperation and, as such, 
permissible for sufficiently weighty reasons, presumably in this case the 
candidate's positions in favor of policies that promoted social justice 
(health insurance for the poor, increased foreign aid, and so forth).39 
The same distinction should be applied to appointed or elected offi-
cials, who are sworn to uphold the law. Father Henry Davis, in his moral 
theology manual, treats the case of Catholic judges and lawyers involved in 
divorce cases as instances of material cooperation in the sin of adultery 
(divorced parties will legally be able to marry, but in God's eyes will be 
committing adultery).4o Fr. Davis judges the cooperation to be remote and 
justified by the value of having conscientious Catholic judges and lawyers. 
He writes, "A judge, who is merely a mouthpiece of the legislator and ad-
35. Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia, Robert Drinan, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rob-
erCDrinan (accessed Nov. 8, 2(05). 
36. As Louis Gasper, long-time congressional staffer and now director of the Center for 
Business Ethics at the University of Dallas, commented, this formulation of a representative's 
relation to constituents is much too simple, since members of Congress conceive of their role as 
leaders. Conversation with Louis Gasper, The Catholic Intellectual Tradition and the Good Soci-
ety, Terrence J. Murphy Institute Conference (April 9, 2(05). They do not see themselves simply 
as spokespersons for their constituents' views. However, he conceded my main point that one 
cannot attribute to a legislator any particular moral view on the basis of any particular vote. How 
she votes, especially on a controversial issue such as abortion, results from weighing many com-
peting considerations, including moral ones. /d. 
37. Henry Davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology vol. 1, 341 (5th ed., Sheed & Ward 1946). 
38. Id. 
39. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Worthiness to Receive Holy Communion, General Principles, 
http://www.defide.comldocumentation.html(accessedNov.20.2005).This document was sent as 
a private communication to the head of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in June 2004. 
Cardinal Ratzinger's letter referred to the grave evil of "formal cooperation" in abortion or eutha-
nasia. The letter contained a note explaining the difference between formal and material coopera-
tion. The note comments, "When a Catholic does not share a candidate's stand in favour of 
abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote 
material cooperation, which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate reasons." /d. 
40. Davis, supra n. 37, at 349. 
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ministers law ready-made, may often cooperate in administering an unjust 
law, for otherwise he would have to resign his office."41 
The focus on the abortion views of legislators may also involve a fail-
ure to attend to the divisions of powers and responsibilities established by 
the Constitution. Legislators in their normal course of lawmaking cannot 
undo the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) overturning state 
laws against abortion. (Of course they have successfully legislated such 
matters as parental notification, which qualifies a minor's right to an abor-
tion. But the Supreme Court has only upheld regulations that maintain the 
basic right to an abortion.) The Supreme Court's exercise of judicial review 
ensures the supremacy of its interpretation of the Constitution, a concept 
established long ago by John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1803). 
Representative Obey wrote in his America article that Archbishop 
Burke objected to his refusal to oppose embryonic stem-cell research and to 
vote to deny female military personnel the right to have abortions in mili-
tary hospitals.42 He gave as his reason for the latter position that he opposed 
limiting U.S. service women's right to any military hospital services.43 
Granted, very good arguments have been made by both proponents and 
opponents of abortion that the Court in Roe v. Wade failed to restrain itself 
within its proper boundaries as interpreter of the Constitution. However re-
grettable this decision may have been, it has become part of the supreme 
law of the land, which all government officeholders pledge to uphold when 
they take their oath of office. 
Of course, the people are not left without recourse if they want to re-
verse a Supreme Court decision. The Constitution provides for a way for 
the people to amend it. One proposed amendment would return the issue to 
the states to decide.44 I am confident that were such an amendment to pass, 
the wills of the majority would be different in different states: abortion 
would be made illegal by some states, but others would allow it (though 
perhaps it would be regulated much more tightly and carefully than it is 
now). In the American government framework of division of powers, over-
turning Roe v. Wade by amending the Constitution is the proper procedure 
for making possible legal protections for the unborn. 
Members of Congress and/or state legislatures (who could by a two-
thirds vote call for Congress to call a convention) would be responsible for 
proposing a constitutional amendment (which would then go to the state 
legislatures for approval). In the process of proposing and ratifying an 
41. [d. 
42. Obey. supra n. 31, at 10. 
43. /d. 
44. See Natl. Comm. Human Life Amend., Human Life Amendments: Major Texts, http:// 
nchla.orgidatasource/idocumentsIHLAmajortexts.pdf (last updated Feb. 2004). Proposed amend-
ments to return power to the states to restrict or allow abortions were H.R. Jt. Res. 427, 93d Congo 
(Mar. 13, 1973) and Sen. Jt. Res. 91, 94th Congo (June 6, 1975). 
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amendment to overturn Roe v. Wade, federal and state legislators would be 
exercising their legitimate constitutional roles. At this point, what was 
noted earlier about appreciating the legitimate role of lower-house members 
representing their constituents' views would apply to a legislator's vote for 
or against proposing and/or ratifying such an amendment. 
In the recent presidential election, the Republican Party proposed a 
much more direct way to overturn Roe v. Wade: elect a president committed 
to filling any Supreme Court vacancies that might occur with appointees 
pledged to overturn this decision. To invoke "proper procedures" as an ob-
jection to such a strategy may seem to be legalism at its worst: all process 
and no substance. According to advocates of the Republican Party's strat-
egy, the protection of unborn lives requires quick and bold action to stop 
the killings going on now. The unborn can't wait for a constitutional 
amendment, which may never come. 
The argument that processes and procedures are important means to 
achieving the common good suggests that this more direct strategy for over-
turning Roe sets a very unfortunate precedent. Granted, it's not just cynics 
who have questioned how frequently Supreme Court justices have been 
calm, above-the-fray, impartial interpreters of our Constitution. However, 
the ideal of a court that is insulated from ordinary politics seems to me to be 
an ideal worth upholding, especially in the name of protecting the constitu-
tional rights of unpopular minorities such as prisoners, aliens, irregular 
combatants, adherents of unpopular religions, and so forth. As Pope John 
XXIII explained in Pacem in Terris, protecting such rights is an important 
element of the common good.45 
Archbishop Levada, the chair of the United States Conference of Cath-
olic Bishops' Committee on Doctrine, fails to appreciate this point. In his 
position paper delivered to the bishops' June 2004 meeting, he responded to 
the Catholic Congress members' appeal to Roe v. Wade by observing that 
Supreme Court decisions can be changed. He gave the telling example of 
Dred Scott v. Sanford as a decision that was reversed, and made it sound as 
though Supreme Court decisions are often changed: "But Supreme Court 
decisions are not infrequently changed or reversed."46 Archbishop Levada 
seems to forget or overlook that it took a bloody civil war and constitutional 
amendments (the Thirteenth and Fourteenth) to overturn Dred Scott. 
The effective protection of constitutionally guaranteed minority rights 
has proven a challenge for majoritarian politics. The extent to which minor-
ities have been able to enjoy protection of their rights has depended in great 
measure on intervention by a Supreme Court insulated from legislative ma-
jorities. Without an effective organ that at critical moments can block op-
45. Pope John XXIII. supra n. 7, at No. 58. 
46. Theodore McCarrick et aI., Interim Reflections of the Task Force on Catholic Bishops 
and Catholic Politicians, 34 Origins 100, 104 (July 1,2004). 
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pressive majorities, minority rights may be denied. A governmental system 
that aims to protect and promote the common good must develop proce-
dures to ensure the protection of minority rights. In the American frame of 
government, the Supreme Court, which aims to be above politics (though 
perhaps this is an ideal not always realized), ensures that minority rights 
receive protection.47 
COMMISSIONS OF INQUIRY AND THE PAPAL BIRTH CONTROL COMMISSION 
a. Commissions of Inquiry 
Interpretation of the fundamental law of a constitution, as we have 
seen, is entrusted to a supreme court, while particular policy proposals and 
decisions are made by the executive and the legislative branches. On mat-
ters of particular moment, typically major governmental failures or pressing 
but highly complicated policy decisions, the executives and/or legislators 
have established independent and impartial commissions of inquiry.48 Such 
commissions gather information and hear testimony from authorities with 
expert knowledge of the matters in question. Both space shuttle losses (Co-
lumbia in February 2003 and Challenger in January 1986) were thoroughly 
investigated by commissions of inquiry that drew on expert testimony and 
testing to uncover what had gone wrong and to make recommendations to 
correct the fatal flaws.49 
Commissions of inquiry marshal experts' best knowledge and views 
on issues, many times on difficult policy questions such as the 2005 discus-
sion about Social Security's long-term financial soundness in light of trends 
toward smaller families and the expected large number of baby boomers 
who will eventually be dependent on Social Security. 50 On controversial 
issues, such commissions aren't likely to develop a complete consensus, but 
47. As John Finnis commented, Archbishop Levada is correct in one sense. Many earlier 
Supreme Court decisions have been overruled by later decisions-for example, the 19305 deci-
sions overturning New Deal economic legislation. He observed, however, that to undo Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973), by appointing judges pledged to overturn it is, in his own words, "a 
high risk strategy." Conversation with John Finnis, The Catholic Intellectual Tradition and the 
Good Society, Terrence J. Murphy Institute Conference (April 9, 2005). I argue there is as much 
at stake in preserving a Supreme Court that in principle impartially interprets the Constitution, 
thus I judge the risk too great. If the people really want to overturn Roe, they should amend the 
Constitution. If the people do not want to amend the Constitution, the success of the "high risk 
strategy" will generate intense acrimony and division. A later president with pro-choice views 
may be tempted to reverse the undoing by a similar strategy. The role of a supreme court as 
impartial arbiter will have been fatally compromised. Such a change risks untold damage to mi-
nority rights and the common good. 
48. Stuart Hampshire, Justice Is Conflict 8-10 (Princeton U. Press 2000). 
49. See Shannon Jones, The Columbia Shuttle Tragedy: Lesson of the Challenger Inquiry, 
http://www.wsws.orgiarticles/2003/may2003/chal-m06.shtml (May 6, 2003). 
50. See generally President's Corum. to Strengthen Soc. Sec., Guiding Principles, http:// 
www.csss.gov/ (accessed Nov. 20, 2005). 
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they may be able to identify some agreed positions, and the commissions 
also allow for dissenting voices and votes.51 
The Papal Birth Control Commission (1963-1966), which was tasked 
to investigate the then-controverted issue of whether artificial means of 
birth control (specifically the anovulant pill) were morally permissible,52 
had some features in common with such governmental commissions of in-
quiry. The brief history of this commission, whose recommendations were 
rejected by Pope Paul VI, shows by way of negative example how such a 
process and procedure might strengthen the Church's teaching mission. 53 
b. The Papal Birth Control Commission 
I don't know what educated laypersons and experts such as you my 
readers and hearers may know about the extended work of this commission. 
But I believe a brief recounting of its history has much to teach the Church 
about the importance of process and procedure for the credibility of its 
teaching in the modem world as characterized by Pope John XXIII's Pacem 
in Terris. 54 
Pope Pius XII had opened the way for Catholic couples to limit the 
size of their families when he endorsed as morally permissible the so-called 
"rhythm method" of abstaining from sexual intercourse during the wife's 
limited fertile period each month. 55 The precise question at issue in the late 
1950s and early 1960s was whether the newly invented anovulant pill was 
also a licit means for couples to limit births. 
The official title of the commission was the "Pontifical Commission 
for the Study of Population, Family, and Births." It was formed in March 
1963 by Pope John XXIII at the suggestion of the Belgian Cardinal 
Suenens.56 The commission grew from an initial six members (four married 
laymen, two priests, but no professional theologians) to thirteen in April 
1964 when Pope Paul VI, who had been elected to succeed John XXIII, 
added seven new members, including five theologians (Redemptorists Ber-
nard Haring and Jan Visser, Jesuits Joseph Fuchs and Marcelino Zalba, and 
Pierre de Locht, a diocesan priest) and two lay sociologists (Bernard Co-
51. See e.g. President's Council on Bioethics, http://www.bioethics.gov/ (accessed Nov. 20, 
2005). For a history on past bioethics commissions, see The President's Council on Bioethics, 
Former Bioethics Commissions, http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/pasccommissions/index.html 
(accessed Nov. 20, 2005). 
52. Two book-length accounts of this commission are Robert Blair Kaiser, The Politics of 
Sex and Religion (Leaven Press 1985), and Robert McClory, Turning Point (Crossroad Publg. Co. 
1995). 
53. Of course the Roman Catholic Church meets periodically in solemn ecumenical councils, 
frequently enough in synods, and consultative bodies of all kinds function at all levels, from 
national bishops' conferences to parish councils. 
54. See Pope John XXIII, supra n. 7, at Nos. 40-45. 
55. John Noonan, Contraception 445-47 (Harvard U. Press 1965). 
56. Kaiser, supra n. 52, at 39. 
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lombo of Italy and Thomas Burch of the USA).57 Two additional priests 
were added in June 1964 (Italians Tullo Goffi and Ferdinando Lambrus-
chini).58 Henri de Riedmatten, Swiss Dominican and roving Vatican ambas-
sador and observer (at the UN in Geneva), served throughout as executive 
secretary. 59 
Later in 1964, the commission was greatly expanded when forty-three 
members were added, including three married couples. Two of the couples 
were doctors; the only couple serving solely to represent married couples 
was Patrick and Patty Crowley, joint heads of the worldwide Catholic Fam-
ily Movement. The expanded commission included thirty-four laypersons, 
twenty-two priests, and two bishops.60 
Robert McClory's account focuses on the role of Patty Crowley. As 
the leaders of the Catholic Family Movement, the Crowleys had extensive 
contact with Catholic married couples throughout the world. Their contribu-
tion was to bring to the commission the voice of married couples, especially 
about the adequacy of the rhythm method. 
Catholic couples' experience with the rhythm method was essential 
evidence for the commission's deliberation. Once the Church came to un-
derstand marital love between the couple as the inclusive aim of marriage 
as God had designed it,61 the consistency between expressions of marital 
love and the method of birth control became a live issue. I assume that if 
the rhythm method had proven to be both effective and generally consistent 
with the sexual expressions of couples' married love, the permissibility of 
the anovulant pill would not have become such a live issue for Catholic 
couples. On the other hand, if the rhythm method did in fact frequently 
frustrate a couple's sexual love, this was telling evidence against its appro-
priateness as a birth control method for couples. The logic of the Church's 
new understanding of marital love's primacy implied that the method of 
fertility limitation had to be at least consistent with expressing marital love 
or, preferably, an enhancer of it. Married couples were the authorities on 
whether (or how well) the rhythm method fit with the sexual expressions of 
their love. 
The Crowleys gathered survey data and testimonies about rhythm from 
over three thousand Catholic married couples. Patty Crowley reported the 
57. Id. at 42-43. 
58. Id. at 54. 
59. McClory. supra n. 52, at 39. 
60. [d. at 62. 
61. This understanding is implicit in Pope Pius XII's acceptance of married couples' right to 
limit the number of their children, and in the limited fertile period in women's monthly cycles. 
Ironically, a clear and full account of this understanding of marriage is given in Paul VI's 
Humanae Vitae (see especially Nos. 8-11), which rejected the commission's recommendations 
and reiterated that rhythm is the only morally acceptable form of birth control. Pope Paul VI, 
Humanae Vitae (July 25, 1968) (available at http://www.vatican.va!holy_father/pauLvi/encycli-
cals/documentslhCp-vi_enc_2507I 968_humanae-vitae3n.html). 
106 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:1 
results of their inquiries at the final meeting of the commission in 1966. She 
reported that, overall, the couples surveyed found rhythm to be inimical to 
their union as couples: 
Is there a bad psychological effect in the use of rhythm? Almost 
without exception, the responses were yes, there is. 
Does rhythm serve any useful purpose at all? A few say it 
may be useful for developing discipline. Nobody says it fosters 
married love. 
Does it contribute to married unity? No. That is the ines-
capable conclusion of the reports we have received .... 
Is rhythm unnatural? Yes-that's the conclusion of these re-
ports .... Over and over, respondents pointed out that nature 
prepares a woman at the time of ovulation to have the greatest 
urge to mate with her husband. Similarly, at that time her hus-
band wants to respond to his wife. She craves his love. Yet month 
after month she must say no to her husband because it is the 
wrong date on the calendar or the thermometer reading isn't 
right. 62 
She ended her presentation with a call for a change in the Church's 
teaching on birth control: 
We think it is time that this Commission recommend that the sa-
credness of conjugal love not be violated by thermometers and 
calendars .... 
We sincerely hope and do respectfully recommend that this Com-
mission redefine the moral imperatives of fertility regulation with 
a view toward bringing them into conformity with our new and 
improved understanding of men and women in today's world.63 
Similar views were presented by Colette Potvin, another of the three 
married women. The sincerity and clarity of the lay women's testimonies 
had a strong impact on those who heard them. The chair of the commission, 
Riedmatten, was moved to comment that such powerful personal testimo-
nies vindicated the decision to invite married couples to be members of the 
commission. 
The theologian members on the commission voted 15-4 in their con-
cluding and decisive vote, first that the teaching of Casti Connubii was not 
irreformable, and second that contraception was not intrinsically evil ac-
cording to natural law. The theologians drafted a report (which was leaked 
to the National Catholic Reporter in 1967)64 that proposed that the unity of 
love and procreation essential to marriage be understood somewhat differ-
ently from how it had been taught by Pope Pius XI in Casti Connubii. Pope 
Pius XI had understood the unity of love and procreation in marriage to 
62. McClory, supra n. 52. at 103-04. 
63. [d. at 105. 
64. Id. at 3. 
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mean that any action intended to separate love and procreation in any sex 
act (e.g., coitus interruptus, use of a condom) was intrinsically wrong. The 
theologians on the commission instead proposed that the unity of love and 
procreation must be preserved in the totality of the married couple's acts of 
sexual intercourse, but not necessarily in any given sex act. Couples who 
had good reasons for limiting the size of their families could licitly choose 
from a variety of birth control measures, including the anovulant pill, as 
long as they did not permanently exclude having children. The use of 
rhythm endorsed by Pope Pius XII was thus not the solely acceptable form 
of birth limitation. The fifteen bishops who had been chosen to make the 
final determination received this report and voted by a significant majority 
(nine solidly for and six split between negative votes and abstentions) to 
accept its recommendations. They sent this statement on to Pope Paul VI as 
the commission's final recommendations.65 
Many things have been written about Paul VI's final decision in 
Humanae Vitae (1968) to reject the commission's recommendation for 
change in the Church's teaching on birth control. Humanae Vitae reiterated 
the teaching that rhythm is the only morally permissible means for couples 
to limit the size of their families. The encyclical explicitly rejected reinter-
preting the inseparable union of love and procreation in marriage in terms 
of the totality of sexual acts within marriage. 
What might be said from a process/procedure perspective? First, and 
most obviously, Paul VI felt compelled to reject the commission's recom-
mendation for a change in Church teaching. To oversimplify: he came to 
believe that the traditional teaching could not be changed without undercut-
ting the legitimacy of the Church's teaching authority in the eyes of the 
faithful. Unfortunately, Pope Paul failed to appreciate the important role 
process and procedure play in constituting an authority's legitimacy. The 
question whether couples' use of the birth control pill was morally permis-
sible was a new question. The answer was not obvious. The commission 
process drew a wide range of Church members-bishops, theologians, doc-
tors, sociologists, and married couples. Members presented position papers, 
reports, survey data, and so forth. Members changed their minds in view of 
the evidence, especially the authoritative witness of couples about the dam-
aging effects of rhythm on their conjugal relationship. The final report, rec-
ommending an endorsement of the legitimacy of the pill, represented the 
outcome of a several-years-Iong process of research, study, debate, and 
discussion. 
Such a process is the human means, in widespread use in our day, by 
which societies of all kinds address new questions while drawing on their 
65. This is my very compressed summary of the main results of the commission's final ses-
sion in May and June of 1966 drawn from McClory's chapters 12 and 13. For the bishops' final 
votes, see especially id. at 127-28. For Kaiser's account of this vote, see Kaiser, supra n. 52, at 
174. 
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core values embodied in their authoritative texts and traditions. The wide-
spread use and usefulness of such commissions of inquiry explains in some 
measure the broad dissent provoked by Humanae Vitae's reiteration of the 
traditional prohibition of artificial means of birth controL As commonly 
noted, Paul VI's conviction that the traditional teaching on birth control 
could not be changed lest the Church's teaching authority be undermined 
produced in many the exact opposite effect. It turned out that failure to 
change after an extensive process of inquiry and debate undercut the credi-
bility of the Church's traditional teaching on birth control. The refusal to 
trust the process of the commission's inquiry and deliberations and to en-
dorse its recommendation hurt the Church's teaching authority. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued in this paper that the Catholic Church needs to learn 
from liberal political theory's emphasis on procedural justice. In particular, 
it can learn the importance of process and procedure in exercising its own 
teaching authority. Two historical examples appeared to me to be sympto-
matic of the failure to appreciate procedural justice. 
The frrst example concerns the approach of some Catholic bishops to 
the issue of abortion as it played out in the 2004 presidential election. Cer-
tain CathoHc elected officials were sanctioned for their alleged support of 
abortion. Legislators' votes on abortion were interpreted as public advocacy 
of its moral permissibility. Such an interpretation, I have tried to show, fails 
to appreciate how a constitution gives specific responsibilities to elected 
and appointed officials. For example, because an elected representative has 
the responsibility to represent constituents' interests, no vote in favor of a 
particular measure should be presumed to be a moral endorsement of it. 
Also, support for the Republican strategy of appointing justices committed 
to overturning Roe v. Wade risks undermining the judiciary's independence 
from majoritarian politics, which has been historically so important for pro-
tecting minority rights. 
The second example I examined was the post-Vatican II history of the 
birth control controversy. The commission of inquiry established by Pope 
Paul VI studied the issue carefully and debated the substantive moral and 
theological issues, including the critical question of whether the traditional 
teaching could be changed. The views of married couples that had tried to 
be faithful to the rhythm method, the only technique allowed, were gath-
ered. After years of discussion and debate, the commission found cogent 
and compelling reasons for a change in the Church's traditional rejection of 
artificial means of contraception. Such a process, in which all voices are 
heard and discussed and the pros and cons of relevant views are assessed, is 
the ordinary means by which organizations decide difficult policy ques-
tions. Pope Paul VI was rightly concerned that a change in Church teaching 
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on the question of contraception would raise questions about the Church's 
authority. Unfortunately, he overlooked the liberal insight that to have fol-
lowed the result of the established process might well have buttressed the 
Church's authority and not undercut it. The Pope's rejection of the result of 
the process in the name of preserving the Church's authority had the ironic 
result of undermining this very authority in many married couples' eyes. 
Rejecting the conclusions of the commission of inquiry was doubly ironic 
in view of papal and conciliar teaching being articulated at this time about 
the clear advantages of constitutional democracy's policies and procedures 
for achieving the common good. 
